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Abstract 
The present article investigates the influence of local governance on agricultural 
advisory services in Tajikistan. The Central Asian Republic of Tajikistan is an 
agricultural country that has been described as a hybrid state, where local governance 
tends to be dominated by a few powerful actors. Local governance processes do have a 
strong influence on the agriculture practise and on the exchange of the knowledge. 
Agricultural advisory services claim various effects in the country. Especially in 
regions that are dominated by monocultures, advisory services have limited success. 
Therefore the present article assumes that the nexus of knowledge and innovation in 
Tajik agriculture is largely dependent on the decision-making of local governance 
processes. The article outlines the important role of local governance for distribution 
and use of knowledge in rural areas and emphasizes the context of agricultural 
advisory services in Tajikistan. 
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Among the 15 successor states of the Soviet Union is Tajikistan the one with the 
lowest per capita gross domestic product (GDP). Although the country has experienced 
steady economic growth since 1997, about two-thirds of the population continue to 
live in poverty (UNDP 2009). Some 75% of the population lives in rural areas; poverty 
is therefore mainly a rural phenomenon. Cotton and wheat are the main cash crops in 
Tajikistan, who alone contribute almost 30% annually to the GDP. However, the over 
all volume of Tajik agricultural output is not sufficient to ensure food security.
1 The 
performance of the sector remains below its potentials (FAO 2008, Robinson et al. 
2008, Lerman et al. 2009a, 2009b).  
Tajikistan’s political culture has been described as neo-patrimonial, with patrons using 
public resources in order to secure the loyalty of their clients. The state is only partially 
present in rural areas, instead informal patron-client relationships are prevalent that can 
reach from very high up in state structures down to individuals in small villages. 
Tajikistan appears as a hybrid state (Zuercher 2005, Koehler 2004), but no weak state. 
In selected areas, as security, interior politics or the cotton industry, the state is 
considerably strong. However, in many other fields, as education, health or 
infrastructure, the state delegated much of its competencies to other agencies and 
actors. On the local level this mixture of state and other actors
2 affects both, local 
governance and agricultural production. While the central government is promoting 
e.g. Freedom to Farm, in many rural areas basic rights of farmers are not guaranteed. 
The distribution of power alternates in most Tajik regions, preventing that a central 
actor as the Ministry of Agriculture implements a nationwide policy. On the opposite, 
farmers are hardly able to lobby effectively for their interests (Livinets 2007, FAO 
2008, Sehring 2006); „the majority of the rural population is excluded from 
information and decision making in the villages“ (Sehring 2009: 74).  
The present paper argues that the heterogeneous picture of agricultural extension and 
knowledge management in Tajikistan derives arises from varying local government 
settings within the country. Despite market economy and land reform, main profits 
from agriculture are made by elites who influence the development of the sector.  
  
2  Social-economic set up of rural areas in Tajikistan 
The transition process from Soviet command economy to a market-oriented, private 
economy stagnated in Tajikistan in the late 90´s of the previous century and led to a 
mixture of both. Political efforts to move the society towards a market economy 
culminated in a set of land reforms (Robinson et al. 2008, Spoor 2007, Porteous 2005, 
Gerber et al. 2005) that produced a vast number of people with heterogeneous access 
to land. Great deals of these new farmers possess only limited knowledge about 
farming (Wall 2006, Eshchanov et al. 2007). “A consequence is that agricultural 
extension and other forms of adult education have a more important role to play in 
[former communist] countries than elsewhere in the world.” (Ban 1999: 121)  
The major part of the rural population are smallholder, who own very small household 
land plots, but accumulate on average 1 to 2 ha through tenure and other leasehold 
                                                 
1 Tajikistan is a low-income, food-deficit country, with the highest rate of undernourished population (56 % of total 
pop.). See WFP, retrieved 04/2010 at: http://www.wfp.org/countries/tajikistan 
2 The heterogeneous local elites consist of former kolkhoz leaders, religious figures or warlords. 
  2mechanisms. The annually available farmland for a family household allows only 
limited production, which alone does not secure livelihood (Herbers 2006, FAO 2008). 
It has been stated that most of them will never manage commercially competitive 
farms; however recent studies underline the growing productivity of smallholder 
production (Lerman et al. 2009, Robinson et al. 2008, FAO 2008).  
Currently the structure of agricultural enterprises in Tajikistan consists of highly 
interdependent farms of various sizes: Big agricultural enterprises, private farms 
(Dehkon farms) and smallholders with household plots (Lerman et al. 2009, Robinson 
et al. 2008, Машрабович 2008). According to the Tajik State Statistic Committee 
(2005) 65% of arable land is owned by private farms. The figure is misleading as 
especially big private enterprises only changed by name, while continuing to work 
kolkhoz-alike. “Unreformed (enterprises and collective dehkan) farms still hold over 
half of sown land in Tajikistan.” (FAO 2008: 7). Especially in cotton growing areas, 
individual private farming is marginal and faces particular problems (ICG 2005). Still, 
collective kolkhoz or sovkhoz successor enterprises control most farmland, with the 
bulk of the rural population employed on these farms. They basically continue to 
produce in the kolkhoz manner, although on lower levels as input, machinery and 
advice is lacking or not appropriate. At the same time, the quality of natural resources 
rapidly declined (Oxfam 2010, Mikhalev 2008). According to the policy of the Tajik 
Government, the land resources of collective enterprises are to be privatized. However, 
heads of such large farms pursue a very reluctant privatization strategy (Porteous 
2005). For the time being, many of these farms maintain the hitherto, i.e. soviet, 
business concept (Robinson et al. 2008); their future development is barely 
predictable.  
Individual Dehkon farmers, who are believed to become the motor of commercial 
farming, possess on an average between 1 and 10 ha of farmland (Robinson et al. 
2008, Herbers 2006b, 2006a). However, the political and economic environment 
causes dependencies. Dehkon farmers are impelled to work in close symbiosis with the 
kolkhoz and sovkhoz successor enterprises in order to accomplish basic forms of 
industrialized farming or to ensure proper access to irrigation and other input. Apart 
from that, private farmers deal with interferences by state administration, local 
governance or farmers associations, especially with regard to cropping decisions 
(Porteous 2005, Wall 2006, ADB 2008). In cotton growing areas, most Dekhon 
farmers obey to a hidden quota regulation on their land, e.g. 70% own crops, 30% 
cotton. In addition, marketing of cash crops as cotton or wheat is managed by 
collective farms and related enterprises that channel profits into the pockets of elites 
(Atta 2008, ICG 2005). The marketing of other produce is hindered by the small 
amounts produced (WFP 2005), only a small surplus is available (Spoor 2007). The 
major part of produce is needed for household consumption. Furthermore, high 
transaction costs prevent market access and local and regional commodity markets 
remain weak (Livinets 2007, FAO 2008). Thus, agriculture commercialisation in 
Tajikistan provides often a very limited income. Eventually, revenues of Dehkon 
farmers are not significantly higher as smallholders and wageworker earnings, so that 
some farmers even abandon private farming (Herbers 2006a, ICG 2005). 
 
3  Local Governance  
The rural society in Tajikistan is structured by different agencies and actors as the state 
or indigenous social bodies, religious and elite figures. Local societies rule their 
  3affairs, e.g. make decisions, through negotiations held between institutions and 
agencies or actors. “Local governance is political organisation of social order in a local 
context which reflects coherent interactions of different actors through historically and 
culturally embedded power structures and networks.” (Boboyorov 2009: 16). This is of 
relevance, as the outcomes of local governance processes do have enormous impact on 
agricultural matters, as they regulate for instance the distribution and use of resources. 
Often, it is not the state that controls local affairs. Decisions are made through local 
governance processes that are executed according to the set of institutions and takes 
place in a given social arena. The latter is called ‘social order’. The term encompasses 
the particular constellation of institutions and agencies or actors which can be found in 
one moment of time (Schetter 2009). It describes an underlying system of flexible 
norms that is obligatory to all members of the community and which has been relevant 
even in times of the complete absence of state (Schetter 2009, Mielke 2007). 
Institutions, famously described by North (1990) as “rules of the game”, are framing 
the political processes (governance) and are enabling and constraining the 
implementation of political contents. Social order however, forms the framework of 
institutional arrangements in which all rural organizations as Mahallas (neighborhood 
associations), professional associations, as well as rural municipalities and kinship 
groups. Traditional collective actions as hashar, sadaqa,  qars, uschr or hums are 
mobilized through social order.
3 Thus, local governance processes are embedded in 
social order. There is a variety of variables influencing both, the shape of social order 
and local governance. For example institutions or the multiple, fluid and dynamic 
nature of collective identities that is depending on both social-cultural contexts and 
political actors (Boboyorov 2009). 
Within this framework, decision-making processes in local communities take place. 
Not all institutions and actors are considered equally, their potential depends on the 
relation to power (Lauth et al. 1999). In many cases, rural communities are dominated 
by powerful actors (elites) that derive their power from land property, key positions in 
the local administration or personal prestige (Wiegmann 2009, Grundmann 2004). 
Elite figures are not acting outside local governance, on the contrary, they are well 
represented in local agencies and organisations in order to steer decision-making 
processes. The local governance process is affected by variables as legitimacy, 
knowledge management, institutions etc. Elites tend to dominate the local governance 
process by controlling a few variables at the same time. “In different rural settlements 
the Soviet kolkhozi  elites, who have maintained the leading positions in rural 
organisations, are actively reinventing and reinterpreting their economic and political 
rights.” (Boboyorov 2009: 1).  
Due to the inconsistent distribution of power within the Tajik state, labelled as hybrid 
state, the public administration does not play a compensating role in local governance 
processes, e.g. as guarantee of rule of law. Some scholars argue that the 
aforementioned unstable conditions generate formal and informal income opportunities 
for the elite and provide extra ways to exercise power (Christophe 2005, Zuercher 
2005). This applies to agriculture production, in some areas elites tend to bloc changes 
and innovation in order to keep the status quo. Eventually their intention leads to 
conserve an established agricultural praxis to protect their basis of power, e.g. clients 
under their patronage, or financial interests. Other collective bodies as buyer and 
                                                 
3 Some informal community institutions are: hashar – collective harvesting; sadaqa – money collection for people 
in need; qars – local tax to finance marriages, diseases, departures to working migration; uschr, hums – local tax to 
finance community projects. 
  4supplier units or farmers associations are often times coopted by local elites and do not 
act in favour of their clientele (Robertson et al. 2008, Herbers 2006a, Wall 2006). 
 
4  Agricultural advisory service and local governance  
Nevertheless, research and advice have been identified as a potential boost to Tajik 
agriculture. It is highly welcomed by both, agronomists and farmers (CACAARI 2009, 
Wason 2002). However, relevant content is currently hardly available through a 
national agricultural advisory system, but from scattered local initiatives. Currently 
there is no centrally steered extension system for whole Tajikistan in place.  
The current situation of agricultural research and extension in Central Asia is weak, as 
previous institutions and knowledge management structures deteriorated since the end 
of the Soviet Union (Morgounov et al. 2001). Agricultural expert knowledge that was 
integrated in Soviet research structures, is partly lost or became outdated (Wall 2006). 
The remains of this knowledge form the basis of current cultivation praxis that often 
times has not changed much. That is especially true for the cotton industry, where 
soviet praxis is widely maintained (Atta 2008, ICG 2005). Despite various efforts by 
international organisations and NGOs to enhance learning and information sharing, the 
overall access to knowledge and ability to exchange knowledge among farmers are 
weak (Livinets 2007, FAO 2008).  
Due to Tajikistan’s mountainous geography it is difficult to communicate in general. 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union and a subsequent civil war had further a 
devastating impact on the country’s infrastructure. After 1991 the information flow 
between the regions came to halt, while shortcomings of communication means 
prevail. Currently there is no common informational space in the country. Taking the 
example of the media, as a cornerstone of public communication, it is hardly present in 
rural areas (Benzmann 2007, Wason 2002). Media in Tajikistan faces harsh restrictions 
and is only sporadic capable to cover agricultural issues (Loersch 2000, NANSMIT 
2009).
4    
This led to a situation, where communication and joint decision-making is 
consequently very difficult. Such principal challenges cause problems to agricultural 
extension, seen as “a series of embedded communicative interventions that are meant, 
among others, to develop and/or induce innovations which supposedly help to resolve 
(usually multi-actor) problematic situations” (Leeuwis et al. 2004: 27). The nexus 
between knowledge and innovation is challenged by the interests of the state and local 
elites. Unlike western extension systems that rely on free choice of farmers regarding 
their farm practise (Röling 1994) farming innovations may be delicate issues in 
Tajikistan, which are monitored closely by the state and powerful local actors. 
Especially in cotton growing areas, farmers are far away from the propagated Freedom 
to Farm (Lerman et al. 2009b). In many cases farmers are impeded to implement 
innovations (Wall 2006, Herbers 2006a, ICG 2005). Most effectively pressure is 
exerted on farmers through ambiguous land tenure rights, leading to high insecurity of 
land property (Robinson et al. 2008, Herbers 2006a).  
                                                 
4  “Zafar Murodov, a reporter for Kulyabskaya Pravda, was detained for an hour by police on 23 January, when he 
was covering a demonstration by a group of market vendors outside the local government building, in the town of 
Vosei, southern Tajikistan. Murodov believes that police, who were forcibly trying to disperse the demonstration, 
wanted to prevent him from reporting the events.” Reported by IFEX, 2006, retrieved 03/2010 at 
http://www.ifex.org/tajikistan/2006/01/27/journalist_detained_prevented_from/ 
  5Local governance processes and subsequently elite figures play in Tajikistan an 
important role for the access and use of agricultural information (Grundmann 2004, 
Wiegmann 2007). The differentiated set up of local governance may explain the mixed 
picture of extension conditions. Agriculture in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous 
Province (GBAO) with ca. 100% of smallholder farmers benefited to large extend 
from regional advisory service with strong gains in productivity and harvest (Bliss 
2006, FAO 2008). However, efforts to improve productivity through extension in the 
Region of Republican Subordination (RRS, cotton and wheat production) were minor 
(Wason 2002). Conditions for advisory work change soundly in these two regions. In 
the case of GBAO one positive indicator is the much advanced privatization, as well as 
a high participation in local governance processes. Areas with intensive smallholder 
cultivation as GBAO, reintroduced traditional farming practices that ensure 
subsistence farming (Bliss 2006). Constraints in RRS derived from governmental 
demand to control farmer knowledge sources, as media or farmers associations. 
Subsequently farmers where prohibited to apply new practises (Robinson et al. 2008, 
Wason 2002). Experiences in the northern province Soghd display a positive ground 
for advisory service, although effects in terms of increased income remains to be seen 
(GAA et al. 2006).  
 
5 Conclusions 
The present article tries to explain the heterogeneous picture of agricultural extension 
and knowledge management in Tajikistan with varying local governance structures. It 
is argued that local governance processes exercise a strong influence on the 
distribution and use of agricultural knowledge. 
Taking into account the unequal alignment of existing agricultural producers towards 
market economy, it is further to question which advice is appropriate. There is a 
demand of generalist advice that reflects the needs of the (subsistence) family unit, 
including the aim of diversifying income opportunities. At the same time agricultural 
extension is ineffective without a good system of input and credit supply and of 
marketing of produce. Because of small land property and the overall lack of 
resources, innovations will apply only to a small percentage of farmland. Especially 
the economic development of the group of Dehkon farmers is key for the Tajik 
agriculture. With regard to the above quoted consideration of Ban (1999), the Tajik 
policy needs to understand on local and national level that the nexus between 
knowledge and innovation is related with productivity growth.  
 
6 References 
ATTA, Don Van (2008). King cotton freezes Tajikistan. CACI.  
BAN, Anne van den (1999). Problems of Agricultural Extension in Developing and 
Former Commnist Countries. In: B.S. Hansra (ed.), Globalising Indian 
agriculture: policies and strategies. New Delhi: Classical Publishing Company. 
BLISS, Frank (2006). Social and Economic Change in the Pamirs (Gorno-Badakhshan, 
Tajikistan). London, New York: Routledge. 
BOBOYOROV, Hafiz (2009). The Role of Collective Identities in Shaping Local 
Governance Institutions in Southern Khatlon of Tajikistan. ESCAS XI 
Conference 2009 on ‘Studying Central Asia: in Quest for New Paths and 
Concepts?’ Budapest, Hungary. 
  6CACAARI (2009). Annual Steering Committee Meeting of CACAARI in Tbilisi, 
Georgia. 
CHRISTOPHE, Barbara (2005). Metamorphosen des Leviathan in einer post-
sozialistischen Gesellschaft : Georgiens Provinz zwischen Fassaden der 
Anarchie und regulativer Allmacht. Bielefeld: Transcript-Verlag. 
CHRISTOPHE, Barbara (2006). Metamorphosen des Leviathan. Strategien des State-
Building in Georgien.  Vortrag gehalten im Rahmen der „Silk Road Lecture“ 
am Zentrum für Entwicklungsforschung (ZEF) am 7. März 2006 Bonn. 
FAO (2008). Report prepared for the European Commission under the EC/FAO Food 
Security Programme.  Phase II Food Security Information for Action: The 
Economic Effects of Land Reform in Tajikistan Rome: EC/FAO Food Security 
Programme. 
GRUNDMANN, Silke (2004). Decision making in the rural Mahalla: Zeravshan Valley, 
Northern Tajikistan. A study commissioned by German Agro Action, 
Tajikistan.  [not published] 
HERBERS, Hiltrud (2006a). Landreform und Existenzsicherung in Tadschikistan: die  
Handlungsmacht der Akteure im Kontext der postsowjetischen Transformation:  
mit 38 Tabellen, Erlangen. Selbstverlag der Fränkischen Geographischen 
Gesellschaft 
HERBERS, Hiltrud (2006b). Handlungsmacht und Handlungsvermögen im 
Transformationsprozess. Erfahrungen aus Tadschikistan. Geographica 
Helvetica 61, 13-20. 
ICG, International Crisis Group (2005). The curse of cotton: Central Asia's destructive 
monoculture. Asia Report N°93. 
ICG, International Crisis Group (2009). Tajikistan: On the road to failure. Asia Report 
N°162. 
KOEHLER, Jan and ZÜRCHER, Christoph (2004). Der Staat und sein Schatten. Zur 
Institutionalisierung hybrider Staatlichkeit im Süd-Kaukasus. WeltTrends 12, 
84 - 96. 
LAUTH, Hans-Joachim and LIEBERT, Ulrike (eds.) (1999). Im Schatten demokratischer 
Legitimität. Informelle Institutionen und politische Partizipation im 
interkulturellen Demokratien-Vergleich. Opladen. 
LEEUWIS, Cees and BAN, Anne van den (2004). Communication for rural innovation: 
rethinking agricultural extension. Oxford: Blackwell Science.  
LERMAN, Zvi and SEDIK, David J. (2009b). Agricultural Development and Household 
Incomes in Central Asia: A Survey of Tajikistan, 2003-2008. Eurasian 
Geography and Economics 50, 301-326. 
LERMAN, Zvi and SEDIK, David J. (2009a). Sources of agricultural productivity growth 
in Central Asia. Agricultural &Applied Economics Association 2009 AAEA & 
ACCI Joint Annual Meeting Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
LIVINETS, S. (2007). Report on Republic of Tajikistan for FAO Assistance. Rome: 
FAO. [not published] 
LOERSCH, André and GRIGORIAN, Mark (2000). Report on the media situation in 
Tajikistan. Geneva, Switzerland: CIMERA. 
MIELKE, Katja, SCHETTER, C. and GLASSNER, R. (2007). Local Governance in Farkhar 
and Warsaj districts of Takhar Province in Northeastern Afghanistan. ZEF 
Amudarya Research Series Paper. Integrated Development, Environment and 
Sustainability Paper, Bonn: ZEF. 
MIKHALEV, Vladimir and REIMOV, Ajiniyaz (2008). Land Degradation in Central Asia.  
  7  8
Development and Transition 2009(09),  Retrieved 05/2009 from: 
http://www.developmentandtransition.net/index.cfm?module=ActiveWeb&pag
e=WebPage&DocumentID=673# 
MORGOUNOV, A. and ZUIDEMA, L. (2001). The Legacy of the Soviet Agricultural 
Research System for the Republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus.  ISNAR 
Research Report 20 The Hague: ISNAR.  
NANSMIT, National Association of Independent Media in Tajikistan (2009). Media 
Monitoring.  Dushanbe, Tajikistan. < http://www.eng.nansmit.tj/ > 
NORTH, Douglas C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance. Cambridge. 
OXFAM, Oxfam International (2010). Reaching Tipping Point? Climate Change and  
Poverty in Tajikistan. Retrieved 02/2010 from:  
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/climate_change/climate-change-
poverty-tajikistan.html 
PORTEOUS, Obie C. (2005). Land Reform in Tajikistan. Field Exchange. 
ROBINSON, Sarah, HIGGINBOTHAM, Ian, GUENTHER, Tanya and GERMAIN, Andrée 
(2008). Land Reform in Tajikistan: Consequences for Tenure Security, 
Agricultural Productivity and Land Management Practices. In: Behnke, Roy. 
The Socio-Economic Causes and Consequences of Desertification in Central 
Asia, 171-203. 
SCHETTER, Conrad (2009). Local Politics in Afghanistan From a State-oriented  
Approach to Social Order.  Concept Paper for the Symposium “Beyond the  
State - Local Politics in Afghanistan” Center for Development Research (ZEF),  
Bonn. 
SEHRING, Jenniver (2009). Path Dependencies and Institutional Bricolage in Post-
Soviet Water Governance. Water Alternatives 2, 61-81. 
UNDP (2009). Human Development Report. < www.undp.org > 
WALL, Caleb (2006). Knowledge Management in Rural Uzbekistan: Peasant, Project 
and Post-Socialist perspectives in Khorezm. Bonn.  
WASON, Armorer (2002). Az Dekhon ba Dekhon (Farmer to Farmer): A Participatory 
Radio Series for Private Farmers in Tajikistan. Rome: FAO. 
WIEGMANN, Gunda (2007). Staatszerfall und -aufbau in Tadschikistan. Lokales 
Regieren nach dem Bürgerkrieg. Osteuropa 57. 
WIEGMANN, Gunda (2009). Socio-political change in Tajikistan: The development 
process, its challenges since the civil war and the silence before the new storm? 
Hamburg: Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Carl von Ossietzky. 
ZUERCHER, Christoph (2005). Gewollte Schwäche. Internationale Politik 60, 13-24. 
МАШРАБОВИЧ, Джураев Бехзод (2008). Особенности формирования и 
функционирования дехканских (фермерских) хозяйств в условиях 
малоземельного региона (на примере Республики Таджикистан).  
Диссертационная работа  выполнена на кафедре «Банковское дело» 
Института экономики Таджикистана. Dushanbe: Институте Экономики 
сельского хозяйства Таджикской академии сельскохозяйственных  наук. 